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Case No. 20050996-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Mark Allen Gordon, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of a controlled substance 
in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2005), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free 
zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (West 
2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for possessing 
cocaine and paraphernalia (Altoids tin) where the contraband was found in the 
cushion where defendant was sitting, defendant made furtive gestures after the 
officer activated his overhead lights, and in the face of a prior claim that he did not 
know what was in the tin, defendant denied possessing "crack cocaine"? 
Standard of Review. When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court "review[s] the record to see if the clear weight of the evidence, 
not including demeanor and credibility, is contrary to the verdict/7 State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786,787 (Utah 1988). The conviction will not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,192-93 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, but the text of those offenses is not determinative 
of the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of cocaine in a drug-
free zone, a second degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-
free zone, a class A misdemeanor. R. 2-1, 21-20. After holding a preliminary 
hearing, a magistrate bound defendant over to stand trial on both counts. R. 24-23, 
78. Defendant waived a jury trial and the case was tried before the Honorable 
Claudia Laycock. R. 49,60-56. The trial court found defendant guilty of both counts 
as charged. R. 59; R. 79:145-51. 
After receiving a presentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in prison for the cocaine 
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conviction and 365 days in jail for the paraphernalia conviction. R. 68-66, 81. The 
court suspended the sentence, placed defendant on supervised probation, and 
ordered that defendant serve 270 days in jail. R. 68-66, 81. Defendant timely 
appealed. R. 70-69. 
Summary of Facts 
While on routine patrol on the night of July 9, 2005, Officer William Crook 
stopped at a red traffic light behind a Chevrolet Celebrity. R. 79:40,47. Two men, 
including the driver, were seated in the front seat of the car, and two men were 
seated in the backseat. R. 79: 43. Officer Crook ran a computer check on the car, 
revealing an expired registration and an arrest warrant for Eric Wahlberg—the 
registered owner of the car—for drug possession. R. 79: 40-41, 43, 58. After the 
traffic light turned green, Officer Crook activated his overhead wig-wag lights and 
turned on his spotlight to illuminate the inside of the car. R. 79: 40-41,59. The car 
pulled over less than 400 feet of a public parking lot— a drug free zone—and Officer 
Crook radioed for backup. See R. 79: 56-57, 72-73, 82-83. 
During the three to five seconds it took the car to pull over, defendant—who 
was sitting in the backseat directly behind the driver—made what Officer Crook 
described as "furtive movements/' R. 79: 41-43, 59. "[H]e turned slightly to his 
right towards the center of the vehicle, his head turned, . . . [he] kind of ducked 
down, as if he was [sic] looking down/ ' and "ma[de] movements as though he was 
[sic] hiding something/7 R. 79: 41-42, 99. Officer Crook did not observe any other 
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occupants make furtive movements. R. 79: 60. By the time Officer Crook walked up 
to the car, defendant was facing forward with his hands in his lap. R. 79: 43, 60. 
After reviewing the driver's identification and confirming his identity as Eric 
Wahlberg, Officer Crook arrested him on the outstanding warrant. See R. 79: 73,83. 
By this time, Officer Orlando Ruiz had arrived as backup. R. 79: 82-83. The officers 
handcuffed Wahlberg and placed him in the police cruiser. R. 79: 73, 83. The 
passengers— who all appeared inebriated —were asked to exit the car so that the 
officers could search the car incident to arrest. R. 79:43,51,73,83,86-88. Officer Jeff 
Bailey, who had just arrived, stood with the passengers near the police cruiser as 
Officers Crook and Ruiz searched Wahlberg's car. R. 79: 43, 50-51, 61, 73, 79, 83. 
Officer Crook found an Altoids tin "in the backseat [cushion], in the exact location 
where [he] watched [defendant] turn." R. 79: 44-46, 50, 61, 88-92. Officer Crook 
opened the tin and found two small baggies containing crack cocaine. R. 79:44-47, 
50-51, 70, 83; State Exh. #4. The officers discovered no other contraband in the car. 
R. 79: 97-98. 
Officer Crook confronted defendant about the drugs, but did not tell him 
what kind of drugs were found in the tin, nor did he show him the drugs or 
otherwise expose them to his view. R. 79: 53-55, 64. Defendant denied any 
knowledge of the tin or its contents. R. 79: 53. Officer Crook then advised 
defendant that he was under arrest for possession of a controlled substance, 
handcuffed him, and read him his Miranda rights. R. 79:53,85,110. Wahlberg's car 
was released to one of the two remaining passengers, neither of whom was arrested. 
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R. 79: 54,100. Officer Crook then transported defendant and Wahlberg to the Utah 
County Jail. R. 79: 54, 85. 
On the way to jail, defendant continued to deny possession of the drugs, 
contending that Wahlberg had previously sat in the backseat. R. 79: 62-64, 111. He 
asked whether marijuana, methamphetamine, or cocaine was found in the tin, but 
Officer Crook did not respond to his queries. R. 79:113,124. Defendant became 
increasingly upset, spewing a tirade of profanities. R. 79:124. Finally, Officer Crook 
turned up the radio volume in the back to drown out his screaming. R. 79:118,124. 
At some point during the booking process, defendant was taken to a holding 
cell near where Officer Crook was finishing his police report. R. 79: 54,112. Upon 
reaching the cell, defendant proclaimed to Officer Crook that "it wasn't his crack 
cocaine in the car." R. 79: 54,122. Aware of defendant's prior claim that he did not 
know the identity of the drugs in the tin, Officer Crook responded, "Look, I never 
pointed out what was in the container. There's no way you could have known what 
was in the container." R. 79:55. Defendant immediately quieted. R. 79:55,113-14.l 
After defendant was jailed, the three officers returned to the police station, 
where Officer Crook booked the tin and drugs into evidence. R. 79: 56. Police 
1
 Officers Ruiz and Bailey both testified at trial that they themselves did not 
learn the identity of the drugs until they arrived at the police station, after defendant 
was transported to the jail. R. 79: 65, 78-79, 84-85. Defendant also testified that 
police did not tip him off to the identity of the drugs on the night of his arrest, either 
through word or action. R. 79:113-14. 
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attempted to lift fingerprints from the tin, but a fingerprint analysis found "no latent 
impressions of comparable value/7 R. 79: 67; Def. Exh. #5. 
Defendant's Trial Testimony. At trial, defendant acknowledged seeing the 
Altoids tin on the dashboard of the car, but continued to deny any knowledge of 
what was in the tin. R. 79:103,113-14,119-20. He denied making any reference to 
"crack cocaine" at the jail and claimed that he did not learn that the tin contained 
cocaine until his first appearance in court. R. 79:114. Defendant also attempted to 
explain the furtive movements to which Officer Crook testified. He asserted that he 
took off a cap and placed it on his knee when the officer activated his overhead 
lights. R. 79:109. Officer Crook later testified in rebuttal that he did not observe 
defendant remove a hat. R. 79: 121. Defendant also attempted to explain away 
Officer Ruiz's testimony that he had bloodshot eyes, smelled heavily of alcohol, and 
appeared intoxicated. See R. 79: 87-88. Defendant denied that he was intoxicated 
that evening. R. 79:116. He acknowledged that he purchased a pack of beer, but 
admitted to drinking only one beer. R. 79:101-03,108,115. He explained that his 
eyes may have been bloodshot because he had spent a sleepless night at jail the 
night before on a charge of public intoxication. R. 79:101-03,108,115-16. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
constructively possessed the contraband. This claim fails. Defendant's close 
proximity to the drugs, his furtive movements after the officer activated his 
overhead lights, and his jailhouse reference to "crack cocaine/' in the face of a prior 
claim that he did not know what was in the tin, demonstrated that defendant was 
more than an innocent bystander. It established a sufficient nexus between 
defendant and the contraband to permit the inference that defendant had both the 
power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs. Defendant's 
convictions, therefore, were not against the clear weight of the evidence and should 
be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED A SUFFICIENT NEXUS BETWEEN 
DEFENDANT AND THE CONTRABAND TO PERMIT A FINDING 
OF CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION 
Defendant contends that his presence in the vehicle where the drugs and 
paraphernalia were found was insufficient to establish his possession of those items. 
Aplt. Brf. at 12-18. The evidence, however, which consisted of more than 
defendant's mere presence in the car, was sufficient to sustain defendant's 
convictions. 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, [this Court] 
must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made.'" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988) 
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987)); accord State v. Gordon, 2004 
UT 2, | 5, 84 P.3d 1167. As explained in Walker, this standard is no different than 
the "clearly erroneous" standard applied to other factual determinations made by 
trial courts. Walker, 743 P.2d at 192-93; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (stating that a trial 
court's factual findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous"). 
Under the clearly erroneous standard, the appellate court "'does not consider 
and weigh the evidence de novo'" or otherwise retry the case. Walker, 743 P.2d at 
193 (quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)). Rather, it 
"accord[s] deference to the trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate 
credibility and demeanor." Goodman, 763 P.2d at 787. Reversal is only appropriate 
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"if the clear weight of the evidence, not including demeanor and credibility, is 
contrary to the verdict/' Id. In this case, the evidence was sufficient to support the 
trial court's verdict. 
Possession of a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia may be proved by 
showing that the defendant had either "actual possession" or "constructive 
possession" of the contraband. See State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, % 31,122 P.3d 639. 
Actual possession occurs when the contraband is found on the defendant's person 
or is otherwise under his or her direct control. See State v. Carter, 696 N. W.2d 31,38 
(Iowa 2005) (holding that "[a]ctual possession occurs when the controlled substance 
is found on the defendant's person"); State v. Matthews, 484 P.2d 942, 943 (Wash. 
App. 1971) (holding that" [a]ctual possession is proved when the drugs are found to 
be in the actual, physical custody of the person charged with possession"). Because 
the contraband in this case was not found on defendant's person, the State was 
required to prove that defendant had constructive possession of the drugs and 
paraphernalia found in the car. See id. 
To prove constructive possession, the State must introduce evidence 
establishing "'a sufficient nexus between the accused and the [contraband] to permit 
an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise 
dominion and control over the [contraband].'" Workman, 2005 UT 66, % 31 (quoting 
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,319 (Utah 1985)). In other words, "[t]here must be some 
action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the narcotics and 
indicates that he had some stake in them, some power over them." Rivas v. United 
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States, 783 A.2d 125,130 (D.C. 2001). Simply stated, "[t]here must be something to 
prove that the individual was not merely an innocent bystander." Id. 
Whether a defendant had a sufficient nexus to infer constructive possession is 
"a highly fact-sensitive determination," State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 14,985 R2d 
911, which "depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case," Fox, 709 P.2d 
at 319. In making that determination, courts may consider such factors as 
"ownership and /or occupancy of the . . . vehicle where the drugs were found, 
presence of defendant at the time drugs were found, defendant's proximity to the 
drugs, previous drug use, incriminating statements or behavior, [and] presence of 
drugs in a specific area where the defendant had control." Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 
32. However, this list of factors is not to be treated as "a checklist of things that 
must be present if the law's requirements are to be met." Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15. 
The listed factors are not "universally pertinent" and the list is not "exhaustive." Id. 
at Iff 14-15; accord Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 32. 
As explained in Layman, "[t]he final legal test is the most generally-worded 
one," i.e., whether the facts and circumstances establish "a sufficient nexus between 
the defendant and the drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the 
defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control over the drugs or 
paraphernalia." Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15. The State introduced ample evidence in 
this case to establish such a nexus. 
Defendant rests much of his argument on the fact that the drugs were found 
in Eric Wahlberg's car and that Wahlberg had an outstanding drug warrant. Aplt. 
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Brf. at 16-18. While these factors would tend to support an inference that Wahlberg 
possessed the drugs, they are insufficient to negate the stronger inference that 
defendant constructively possessed the drugs. 
Although defendant did not own the car where the contraband was found 
and was not the driver, he was one of three passengers in the vehicle. R. 79:41-42. 
Defendant's "'mere presence . . . in an automobile in which illicit drugs are found 
does not, without more, constitute sufficient proof of his possession"7 of the 
contraband. State v. Solas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
Annotation, Conviction of Possession of Illicit Drugs Found in Automobile of Which 
Defendant Was Not Sole Occupant, 57 A.L.R.3d 1319, 1326 (1974)). Defendant's 
conviction, however, did not rest merely on his presence in Wahlberg's car. There 
was more. 
Close Proximity to Drugs. Defendant was sitting in the backseat on the same 
side where the drugs were found. R. 79: 42, 44-45. Although the other backseat 
passenger had the ability to access the drugs, defendant was closest to the drugs, 
and therefore, of all the occupants in the car, he had the most ready access to the 
drugs. See Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 32 (concluding that "defendant's proximity to 
the drugs" is a relevant consideration in determining constructive possession); see 
also Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39 (concluding that finding contraband "on the same side 
of the car seat as the accused or immediately next to him" is a factor supporting 
constructive possession). 
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Furtive Gestures. Defendant also made "furtive movements" in the direction 
of the drugs almost immediately after Officer Crook activated his overhead lights. 
R. 79:41-43,59. Defendant "turnfed] towards the spot where the drugs were [later] 
located77 by police, turned his head and "kind of ducked down,77 and "ma[de] 
movements as though he [were] hiding something.77 R. 79: 41-42, 99. Contrary to 
defendant's claim, Aplt. Brf. at 15, such furtive gestures are strongly indicative of an 
intent to exercise dominion and control over the objects located in that area. See 
United States v. Flenoid, 718 F.2d 867,868 (8th Or. 1983) (holding "testimony that the 
defendant may have placed something in the spot where the police later found the 
weapon can support a finding of possession77); United States v. Gutierrez, 995 F.2d 
169,171 (9th Cir. 1993) (same, quoting Flenoid); see also United States v. Bowen, 437 
F.3d 1009, 1016 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a passenger's furtive movements 
supported a finding of constructive possession); Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 
574 (Ind. 2006) (recognizing that "furtive gestures" support a finding of constructive 
possession); Williams v. United States, 884 A.2d 587, 604 (D.C. 2005) (holding that 
defendant's repeated furtive gestures in the location where the firearm was found 
"provided more than a sufficient basis upon which a reasonable juror could infer 
beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] both knew of the gun and intended to 
conceal it77); Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 39 (recognizing "suspicious activity by the 
accused" as a factor supporting a finding of constructive possession). 
Defendant argues, however, that the other backseat passenger was also in 
close proximity to the drugs, implying that he too had ready access to the 
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contraband. See Aplt. Brt. a I 16-17. This may be true, but unlike defendant, that 
passenger was never seen making furtive movements, nor was any other occupant 
of the car. See R. 79: 60 I )efendant's "furtive movements in contrast to the 
passenger's lack of such movements would further s u p p o r t . . . an inference" of 
defendant's constructive possession. Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 41; accord State v. Herrera, 
2002 UT App 55U, \ 3 (recognizing that finding of constructive possession of the 
drugs and paraphernalia was supported in part by the fact that "the occupants in 
the front seat of the car were not observed making any furtive movements") 
(Addendum A). 
"Crack Cocaine." Perhaps most damning, defendant inadvertently exposed his 
deceit to police when he told Officer Crook at the jail that it was not his "crack 
cocaine" that was found in the car. R. 79: 54,122. As defendant admitted at trial, 
police did not tell him what kind of drugs were found in the car, nor was he ever 
given the opportunity to see the drugs after police discovered them. R. 79:54-55,64-
65, 78-79, 84-85,113-14. Defendant disputes making the comment, but complains 
that even if he had, it merely establishes his knowledge of the drugs and is 
insufficient to establish intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs. 
Aplt. Brf. at 18. That statement, however, evidences more than just knowledge. His 
deceit on this point, exposed by his statement at the jail, suggests not only 
knowledge, but a guilty conscience that he was connected 1o tl c dru^s. See 
Workman, 2005 UT 66, % 34 & n.2. His deceit was strong evidence that defendant 
"was not merely an innocent bystander." Rivas, 783 A.2d at 130. 
13 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court's finding of constructive 
possession fails to "preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" because it 
ignores, among other things, that the four people in the car "all traded places part 
way through the journey" and that defendant "denied having any knowledge or 
association with the drugs." Aplt. Brf. at 16,18. This argument misconstrues the 
"reasonable hypothesis" rule. 
"'[T]he mere existence of conflicting evidence. . . does not warrant reversal'" 
under the "reasonable hypothesis" rule. State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 695 (Utah 
App. 1995) (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991)), cert, denied, 913 
P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). The rule simply requires that the conviction "be based upon 
what the [trier of fact] regards as substantial and credible evidence." State v. John, 
586 P.2d 410,412 (Utah 1978); accord Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 695 (holding that the rule 
"simply 'insur[es] that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of 
the charge to enable a [trier of fact] to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
defendant committed the crime'"). Where the factfinder rejects certain testimony, 
an alternate reasonable hypothesis based on that testimony does not prevent the 
factfinder from concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 695. Such was the case here. See R. 149 (trial judge stating that 
"[i]t is clear to me that the defendant's version of the events attempts to dovetail 
very nicely into the officer's versions of the events, but I find that the testimony is 
self-serving and not believable"). 
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In sum, defendant's presence in t he car, next to where the drugs and 
paraphernalia were found, together with his furtive gestures in the direction of the 
drugs, and his reference to "crack cocaine" at the jail, established a "sufficient nexus 
between [him] and the [contraband] to permit an inference that [he] had both the 
power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the [contraband]/" 
Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 31 (citation omitted). The conviction, therefore, is not 
"'against the clear weight of the evidence/" nor can it be said with "'a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made/" Goodman, 763 P.2d at 786-87 
(citation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted October 11,2006. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
jfemrey S. Gray 
'Assistant Attorney 
Counsel for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on October 11,2006,1 served two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Mark Allen Gordon, by causing 
them to be delivered by first class mail to his counsel of record as follows: 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
99 E. Center St. 
P.O. Box 1895 
Provo, UT 84059-1895 
10/11/2006 8:09 PM 
rey S. Gray 
{Assistant Attorney Gerferal 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Daniel Herrera, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000819-CA 
F I L E D 
February 22, 2002 
|2002UTApp55 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine, enhanced to a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),(d) & (4)(a)-(b) (Supp. 
2000), and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1998), asserting that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find he 
had constructive possession of the illegal items. We affirm. 
When reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, this court views the 
'"evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom . . . 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of 
which he was convicted.1" 
State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 
1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)). 
Because the methamphetamine and paraphernalia were not found on defendant's 
person, but in the backseat area of a vehicle where defendant was sitting alone, it must be 
established that defendant had constructive possession of the drugs and paraphernalia. 
Constructive possession can be found when: 
"[T]here [is] a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug [or 
paraphernalia] to permit an inference that the accused had both power and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug [or paraphernalia]." 
State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,113, 985 P.2d 911 (quoting State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 
(Utah 1985)). "[T]he determination that someone has constructive possession of dmgs is a 
factual determination which turns on the particular circumstances of the case." Fox, 709 P.2d 
at 319. Defendant's "mere occupancy of a portion of the premises where the drug[s were] 
found cannot, without more, support a finding" that defendant knowingly and intentionally 
possessed a controlled substance. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). However, 
constructive possession may be established through circumstantial evidence. See State v. 
Carlson, 635 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981). 
At trial, the State introduced the following evidence: (1) defendant was the sole 
occupant of the backseat of the vehicle; (2) defendant was seen ducking down and reaching 
underneath the driver's seat where the methamphetamine was found; (3) a black box 
containing drugs and paraphernalia was found open, in plain view, on the passenger side 
floorboard of the backseat; (4) defendant was the only one in close proximity to the drugs 
and paraphernalia; and (5) the occupants in the front seat of the car were not observed 
making any furtive movements. Given this circumstantial evidence against defendant, we 
cannot say that the evidence was "'sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime for which he was convicted.'" Salas, 820 P.2d at 1387 (citation omitted). 
We conclude that sufficient evidence existed to prove a "nexus between [defendant] 
and the drug[s and paraphernalia] to permit an inference that [defendant] had both the power 
and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug[s and 
paraphernalia]." Layman, 1999 UT 79 at [^13. Therefore, we affirm defendant's conviction.(1) 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Because we affirm defendant's convictions, we do not reach the State's argument under 
State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346. 
